Women in Higher Education in Iran: How the Islamic Revolution Contributed to an Increase in Female Enrollment by Winn, Meredith Katherine
Global Tides
Volume 10 Article 10
1-1-2016
Women in Higher Education in Iran: How the
Islamic Revolution Contributed to an Increase in
Female Enrollment
Meredith Katherine Winn
Pepperdine University, Malibu, meredith.winn@pepperdine.edu
This Social Sciences is brought to you for free and open access by the Seaver College at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Global Tides by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact paul.stenis@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Winn, Meredith Katherine (2016) "Women in Higher Education in Iran: How the Islamic Revolution Contributed to an Increase in
Female Enrollment," Global Tides: Vol. 10, Article 10.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/globaltides/vol10/iss1/10
  1 
Introduction  
 
 In 1979, Iran underwent a drastic social and political change called the 
Islamic Revolution. When Ayatollah Khomeini rose to power amid sweeping 
popular dissent and disdain for the existing Western-oriented regime, Iran went 
from a secular nation to an Islamic republic. This change drastically shifted 
society and social practice. Many observers, particularly those from the West, 
lamented the abysmal state of rights and opportunities for Iranian women after the 
revolution. While it is indeed true that women in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
have often been deprived of their rights, this narrative lacks nuance and fails to 
consider the difficulties facing women before the revolution. Moreover, it does 
not account for the ways that the rights of Iranian women have improved since the 
Islamic Revolution, particularly in education. After the revolution, women began 
enrolling in higher education at unprecedented rates. This increase of women in 
higher education provides an effective lens for viewing the role of women in 
society. A careful examination of women in the Iranian system of higher 
education reveals complex religious, political, and cultural features that have at 
times both enabled and prevented women from achieving highly in the university 
setting. This paper will explore the participation of women in Iranian higher 
education from the revolution to today. In doing so, it will demonstrate the 
paradoxical relationship the Islamic Revolution has had with women’s roles in the 
public realm and the direct way that Islamic ideals promoted during the revolution 
encouraged women to study. Ultimately, it will conclude that the Islamic 
Revolution helped facilitate a system where women could succeed in education; 
as more women became educated under this system, there was a general increase 
in women calling for reform of the discriminatory gender policies implemented 
after the revolution. Overall, this increase in women in higher education has 
contributed to the rise of Islamic feminism and an intrinsic movement of Iranian 
women pursuing advancement of their legal and social status. 
 
Review of Existing Research 
 
 The phenomena of increasing female enrollment in Iranian institutions of 
higher education since 1989 has been well-documented in existing research. Some 
researchers attribute this rise to Khomeini. His call for women to be active 
participants in the revolution was a mobilizing force that led to women's 
participation in the public sector through higher education.1 Others posit that the 
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government would rather have fewer women in higher education. Indeed, 
researchers such as Mitra K. Shavarini note the national debate on the 
establishment of quotas to reduce the number of women entering universities. 
Because women are passing the college entrance exam and, thus, entering 
universities at higher rates than men,2 she argues that the government has begun 
to fear women. Despite the early encouragement for women to participate 
politically and obtain an education, Shavarini points out that the large number of 
educated women pose a threat to the existing patriarchy of Iranian society. 
However, despite the more recent push for a reduction of female university 
enrollees, Shavarini notes that the government does not use religious arguments; 
she asserts that this is because the religion of Islam cannot justify withholding 
education from women.3  
Golfer Mehran's research, on the other hand, demonstrates a continued 
dominance of men in the highest levels of academia. Men drastically outnumber 
women in teaching positions at Iranian universities. Only eight percent of those 
occupying the highest ranking university teaching positions were female in the 
2007-2008 academic year. There are similar gender gaps among those studying 
for the more elite doctoral and masters degrees.4 Indeed, gender discrimination in 
Iran is a continuing problem for women. Rossana Bahramitash offers an in-depth 
view of women’s economic role in Iran before and after the revolution. Her 
research shows that during the two decades following the Iranian Revolution, the 
growth of female employment has risen more than during the former Pahlavi 
regime. She argues this is a result of Islam breaking down barriers that hindered 
women's opportunities to participate in the public sector.5 However, it is 
important to note that even in this more optimistic research, indicators still show 
women working at much lower rates than men in Iran. Moreover, in their research 
Goli M. Rezai-Rashti and Valentine Moghadam point out the difficulty for Iranian 
women seeking employment. Through data and personal interviews the 
researchers demonstrate an economic, social, and legal system that favors men. 
This means that although women continue to perform well academically, they are 
consistently underrepresented in the labor market. This is due to a complicated 
mixture of a cultural history of patriarchy that leads to negative perceptions of 
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women seeking work outside the home, a conservative religious environment that 
tends to make men hesitant to work with marriageable women, and an already 
struggling economic system where there are fewer jobs than people ready to 
work. As a result, young women report experiencing high rates of open 
discrimination in the work place and difficulty finding professional placement.6 
 There is also a significant body of work that points out the importance of 
feminism, specifically the emergence Islamic feminism in Iranian universities and 
in the society as a whole. Islamic feminism is important in understanding women 
and their role in and access to higher education. Shavarini defines the term 
“Muslim feminism” as a branch within the larger body of feminist thought that 
seeks to improve the status of women, legally and socially, within the Muslim 
world. Muslim feminism identifies religion as one of the problems women must 
overcome, and it rejects the Western feminism that came alongside modernization 
as sexually exploitive and colonialist in nature.7 Halper notes that the very fact 
that the government is Islamic in nature provides room for religious debate within 
the context of legal rights for women. As a result, Islamic feminists are able to 
reinterpret religious texts to support their advocacy for more legal rights.8 Janet 
Afary further addresses this tendency in her book, adding that Islamic feminists 
focus on religious writers who reinterpret Shari’a law to favor women’s rights and 
lawyers who seek more egalitarian family laws.9 Afary acknowledges that new 
interpretations of the Koran have been giving women a more public role since the 
start of the Revolution when Khomeini used religion as a call to action among 
women.10 Amina Tawasil further examines conservative Islamic women who 
study in seminaries. These women also break down gender barriers by using and 
reinterpreting the Islamic texts to justify higher education and a more public role 
for women in Iran. These highly educated, religiously conservative women view 
Islam as a means, rather than an obstacle, to overcoming gender oppression.11 The 
emergence of Islamic feminism is an extremely important feature in 
understanding the rise of women in universities. However, to fully appreciate the 
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movement, it is useful to have a complete understanding of the religious and 
social climate into which it was born. For this reason, this paper will first discuss 
the various political developments since the Islamic Revolution before focusing 
on the Islamic feminist movement in more depth.  
 
Gender and Politics on the Eve of the Revolution   
 
 While researchers note the problematic Westernized narrative of the 
oppressed Muslim woman12 and the perception among Westerners that the poor 
social and legal situation of Iranian women is inherent to the Islamic nature of the 
government,13 it is important to note that the long tradition of patriarchy and the 
minimal involvement of women in the public sector in Iran predates the Islamic 
Revolution of 1979. For example, women were not given the right to vote until 
1963, and criticism of women’s suffrage was prominent not only among religious 
clerics but also members of the less-religious middle class. What's more even 
some progressives opposed women’s suffrage.14 Many critics point out the higher 
rates of female employment in industrialized nations than in majority Muslim 
nations.15 However, an examination of Iranian history reveals a low rate of female 
employment during the modernization and Westernization movements of the 
secular Pahlavi regime. Although veiling for women was outlawed in 1936 by 
Reza Shah, this move was more a political symbol of a secular state than an effort 
to curtail the tradition of patriarchy in Iran.16 In fact, patriarchal cultural 
tendencies continued throughout the 20th century. As Bahramitash notes, despite 
more legal freedom for women during this period, female employment did not 
begin to significantly increase until the 1960s,17 coinciding with the White 
Revolution of Mohammad Reza Shah. Yet, although there was an increase in 
female employment under the modern government of the Shah, Bahramitash 
observes that this rise was less significant than the rise that occurred after the 
Islamic Revolution.18 This indicates that there is not necessarily a relationship 
between an Islamic government and a decrease in the presence of women in the 
public sector as some have suggested. Moreover, it shows that the challenges 
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facing women in Iran are long-standing and not necessarily resulting from the 
implementation of an Islamic government. 
 Further, it is necessary to point out the huge rise in educated women since 
the Islamic Revolution. According to Shavarini, on the eve of the revolution 
female university enrollment was at its peak. However, she critiques the statistics 
for excluding women from rural areas or from low socio-economic backgrounds, 
as well as minority women. Because the school system of the Pahlavi era was 
secular, many women (and men) from culturally and religious traditional families 
did not attend school.19 Indeed, Rezai-Rashti cites data showing an increase in 
literacy among women after the 1979 Revolution, with 35.5 % of all Iranian 
women (not just the socially elite) being literate in 1976 compared to 52.1% in 
1986.20 Thus, it is evident that there was a significant problem in women’s 
education and employment prior to the institution of an Islamic government in 
Iran.  
 The low status of women in Iran even during the era of modernization is 
unsurprising given the tradition of patriarchy existing in Persian culture. 
Jamsheed K. Choksy notes that during the Sasanian era of Iranian history, the 
period when Islam was being introduced to the region, the Muslim caliphs were 
typically relaxed in their enforcement of Muslim norms, and, as a result, many 
typically Iranian traditions and norms continued in Persian society. Under the 
Muslim Umayyad Dynasty that brought Islam to the region, the legal status of 
women did not change from the existing Persian norms; women, even Muslim 
women, continued to be treated as property—bought, sold, and exchanged.21 
Thus, it is clear that patriarchal social structures were aspects of Iranian culture 
before the introduction of Islam. The perpetuation of this patriarchy into the 20th 
century, as evidenced by the generally unequal conditions for most women under 
the secular Pahlavi regime, is, therefore, unsurprising, nor should it be attributed 
solely to Islam.  
 
Khomeini and the Era of Revolution  
 
 After his rise to power in 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini became one of the 
public figures with the most influence on women in Iran. Khomeini had a 
paradoxical influence on the presence of women at universities and, broadly 
speaking, in the public realm as a whole. On the one hand, the Islamic Revolution 
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was largely dependent on the political activity of women. Khomeini called on 
women to militarize and come out in support of an Islamic government during the 
revolution, and afterward, he advocated for female education.22 According to the 
conservative Shi’a religious community in Iran, women’s education is a duty. 
Although the role of motherhood was heavily emphasized by the revolutionary 
regime, education was also necessary in order to raise strong Islamic children 
well-grounded in the Islamic sciences and Koranic texts.23  
 Yet, even as education was being emphasized for young women as an 
Islamic duty, the education system itself was drastically changing. New laws 
seeking to render the public arena completely Islamic severely limited women’s 
ability to appear and express themselves in public. Veiling became mandatory for 
all women, and strict sex segregation was mandated in institutions of higher 
education.24 In order to make them more 'Islamic,' the new regime closed 
universities from 1980 to 1983. During this time universities underwent a 
sweeping purification process known as the Cultural Revolution. Under the 
Cultural Revolution, the curriculum was examined and evaluated according to 
how well it maintained Islamic values. Faculty whose views were judged to be 
discordant with those of the regime were fired. Further, an ideological test was 
added to the admissions process in an effort to ensure the appropriate moral 
character of all university attendees. Prospective students took a written exam and 
underwent an investigation in which applicants’ neighbors might be interviewed 
to determine suitability.25 Although the universities did eventually reopen, they 
were no longer the institutions created under the Pahlavi regime. With many 
talented faculty gone, fewer and lower quality textbooks, and a redesigned 
curriculum, the universities after 1983 hardly resembled their former selves. 
Under the new system, women were barred from 78 fields of study due to 
“biological reasoning.”26 Most of the subjects from which women were banned 
were technical or in the engineering field.27 
In many ways, the Cultural Revolution led to an overall decrease in 
academic quality. This is a development lamented by Azar Nafisi in her memoir 
of her time as a professor at Tehran University. Nafisi mentions the resulting low 
academic standards of the universities after many dissident faculty members were 
                                                 
22
 Rezai-Rashti, “Politics of Gender Segregation,” 472. 
23
 Tawasil, “Towards the Ideal Revolutionary Shi’i Woman,” 104.  
24
 Rezai-Rashti, “Politics of Gender Segregation,” 473-74.  
25
 Shavarini, “Feminisation of Iranian Higher Education,” 334-35.  
26 Rezai-Rashti, “Politics of Gender Segregation,” 473. 
27
 Ibid.  
6
Global Tides, Vol. 10 [2016], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/globaltides/vol10/iss1/10
  7 
fired and curriculum was censored and monitored.28 This  sentiment is echoed by 
Shavarini in her interviews with Iranian students. A young Iranian student 
expressed to Shavarini that her courses are “weak,”29 complaining that her high 
school courses were more challenging. She also feels that she is forced to take too 
many courses not pertaining to her area of study (at least one Islamic course per 
term). Moreover, she feels that she does not have access to high quality textbooks. 
Shavarini notes that these concerns are not limited to a few students. She points to 
a systemic problem in Iranian universities of unqualified professors, outdated 
books and technology, and highly censored curriculum.30 This problem began 
with Khomeini’s Cultural Revolution and persists in universities today.  
As might be expected after such a drastic change, when the universities 
did reopen fewer female students enrolled than in the previous term. Yet, this 
decrease of women in higher education can be contrasted with an increase of 
women and girls in primary and secondary education. Rezai-Rashti argues that 
this increase in female education immediately following the Cultural Revolution 
was due to the moralizing of the public space. In other words, because the school 
system had become appropriately Islamic through gender segregation and the 
enforcement of morality standards in public spaces, traditional and religious 
families were now more comfortable sending their daughters to school.31 This is 
an important consideration and a fitting explanation considering that by the 1985-
86 academic year, female university enrollment was up to 30% compared to 28% 
during the 1974-75 academic year.32 However, in the face of these modest gains, 
it would be remiss not to also mention the deprivation of rights many women 
encountered at the university. This period was characterized by executions with 
many professors either killed or imprisoned for holding ideas or beliefs were 
deemed a threat to the Islamic Republic. Khomeini's government even executed 
Farrokhru Parsa, the Minister of Education during the Pahlavi regime.33 Further, 
intense discriminatory laws were enacted that presented women with significant 
challenges. The Family Protection Act of 1967 was supplanted by a new body of 
law based on Shari’a that severely limited women’s rights within the family. It is, 
thus, unsurprising that in 1986, the Iranian census indicated growing gender 
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inequality.34 Thus, while women began making modest gains in education soon 
after the revolution, violence and fear still pervaded the university culture. 
 
The Rise of Women at the University 
 
 Nonetheless, the 1990s signified a shift regarding women's involvement in 
education. Despite the low levels of women enrolling in tertiary education 
immediately following the Islamic Revolution, the numbers of women attending 
university rose at unprecedented levels during the 1990s. This period of 
increasing enrollment was also marked by the lifting of many of the restrictions 
on women implemented during the previous decade.35 The complex interplay of 
increasing female enrollment in higher education and the lifting of legal 
restrictions on women will be explored in more detail in a later section. First, it is 
necessary to establish the changing trends and demographics on Iranian university 
campuses in order to more appropriately discuss this phenomenon.  
 It is vital to note that, simply because of the passage of time, many of the 
young women who were increasingly attending primary and secondary education 
during the 1980s were coming of university age in the 1990s, allowing more 
women to be qualified to apply for university admission. This author suggests that 
this fact alone may be largely responsible for the increase of women attending 
universities during this period. However, whether this can be attributed more to 
the natural aging of women or to other shifting social conditions is impossible to 
determine from currently available research. Nonetheless, Rezai-Rashti provides 
data showing a general increase of women in tertiary education in the late 1990’s 
and early 2000’s. In 1997, women comprise 37% of all university students, and by 
2000, they form 45%. This number grows to 51% in 2005.36 This is a remarkable 
reversal of the gender gap in less than ten years. Mehran examines the rates of 
women at the faculty level of universities during this period. While men still 
greatly outnumbered women in university teaching positions, women did gain 
ground between the 1998-99 and the 2007-08 academic years. Unfortunately, 
women made the largest gains as assistant lecturers, the lowest-ranking faculty 
position, while the gender gap at the highest level remained virtually unchanged.37 
Notwithstanding, it is not unreasonable to assume that change occurs more slowly 
at the highest levels of academia. The years of study that it takes to become a 
professor in an Iranian university greatly outnumber the years to become an 
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assistant lecturer because doctoral degrees are necessary to become a professor 
while people holding masters degrees may be considered qualified for a position 
as an assistant lecturer.38 Thus, it will be interesting to watch data emerging in 
coming years to determine if the gender gap will begin to close more rapidly as 
the large number of women enrolled in universities continue their studies and 
eventually achieve doctoral degrees and distinction in their fields or if social 
pressure to marry and have children will keep college-educated women from 
working in academia. One disquieting trend indicating that a gender gap may 
persist among faculty is that only 33% of those studying at the specialized 
doctoral level (the highest degree available) were women during the 2007-2008 
academic year.39 This continuation of the gender gap at the highest levels of 
academia is unsurprising. As Shavarini points out, there is a lack of accomplished 
female role models for young Iranian women. The only feminine ideal the women 
she interviewed were able to produce was Fatima, the daughter of the prophet and 
wife of Ali who is venerated for her role as mother and nurturer.40 This suggests 
that there may remain significant cultural obstacles to overcome for women in 
universities. 
In short, while the increase of women in higher education is a positive 
development, it alone has not resulted in a gender equal society. In the next 
section, this paper will discuss the ongoing challenges facing women despite their 
growing academic achievement as well as the neo-conservative reaction to the 
increase in women’s education.  
 
Continued Challenges and the Neo-Conservative Movement  
 
 So far, this paper has focused primarily on the positive developments for 
women’s education in Iran following the establishment of the Islamic Republic. 
Nonetheless, any discussion of women’s role in Iranian society would be 
incomplete without an examination of the persistent disadvantages women 
continue to face as well as the surge of conservatism that occurred as women 
began making greater gains in the public sector.  
 A conservative movement was certainly present during the reformist 
presidency of Mohammad Khatami beginning in 1997; however, the election of 
the conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the Iranian presidency in 2005 marks 
a significant shift in Iranian public opinion. Whereas under the more lenient laws 
of the Khatami government women on university campuses flourished, the 
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Ahmidenajad government made a decided effort to discourage women’s presence 
in all areas of the public realm, including on university campuses. Much like 
Ayatollah Khomeini had done 30 years earlier, Ahmidenajad forced many 
reformist professors out of the education system. Moreover, women’s high 
academic achievement at universities led to a national debate about the 
establishment of gender quotas. In Iran, there is a rigorous exam called the kunkur 
that determines college admissions. In 2002, 62% of those who passed this exam, 
thus winning eligibility to study at a university, were female. Shortly after the 
release of this information, the Iranian parliament instituted gender quotas in 
public universities. To support this position, they cited the fact that most college-
educated women do not join the work force. Some viewed it, therefore, as a waste 
to spend so many resources educating young women who will not use their degree 
in service to society. Others worried that the gender imbalance would upset the 
social structure of the family and that too many educated women would lead to 
unhappy marriages.41 The conservative government responded to this reversal of 
the gender gap by implementing a strict return to gender segregation. Not only 
were women banned from 77 fields of study at the university level, but men were 
also restricted from certain fields of study deemed to be feminine. The policy of 
gendering the higher education system was intended to limit women’s educational 
options. The Iranian Minister of Science who was responsible for higher 
education under the Ahmadinejad government actively promoted this policy of 
sex segregation as well as the establishment of quotas.42 
As might be expected, this resurgence of political oppression sparked 
strong political resistance, particularly from women’s groups, but this sort of 
dissent was met with harsh punishment including arrest and imprisonment. 
Indeed, the Ahmadinejad government was so anxious to curtail political dissent 
and agitation regarding women’s rights that it closed the popular feminist 
magazine, Zanan, in 2008.43 Nonetheless, despite this seemingly staunch 
commitment to limiting women’s higher education evidenced by the 
government’s strict policy and its intense squelching of any opposition, in 
actuality many of these policies were never practically implemented. Iranian 
universities lacked the faculty and the resources to enforce gender segregation 
among all subjects. Universities that did follow the policy inevitably faced with 
considerable financial hardship. Consequently, the application of sex segregation 
and gender quotas in Iran was ineffective, and the policies were laid aside.44 
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 Even with the relaxing of gender segregation in universities, women 
continue to face many challenges with regards to their education and their 
prospects after receiving their degrees. Shavarini focuses her research on Iranian 
woman, particularly emphasizing the individual voice of young women. She 
conducts interviews and case studies in order to understand the women that make 
up the system. This method is particularly useful in examining the subtlety of the 
gender inequalities in Iranian education, what drives women to educational 
achievement, what they perceive to be their most significant challenges, and how 
they view their own roles within society.  
 For example, Shavarini suggests that one reason women pass the kunkur at 
such high rates is because, as high school students, they have no other outlets. 
Because most extra-curricular activities are not open to girls, they have more time 
to study and prepare for the exam.45 Further, a theme repeated by many of her 
subjects is that education is one of the few ways that they can earn social value. 
Some subjects described the intense familial pressure to do well in school; among 
members of the community and within their extended families, girls who perform 
well on the kunkur and attend universities instantly receive an elevated social 
status.46 Many women see their position in society as second-class and see 
education as the main means by which they may raise their social status.47  
 Another interesting way Iranian women use education to navigate a 
society where they have fewer legal and social rights than men is through the 
practice of mehrieh, a monetary gift for the bride negotiated in the marriage 
contract. Traditionally, women deferred the payment of mehrieh until the end of 
the marriage—either through death or divorce. However, the sum of the money is 
the property of the woman and may be collected at any time. Thus, the ability to 
negotiate a high mehrieh is a means by which a woman can increase her social 
power and ensure rights she is not afforded by law. Since the Revolution, the 
practice of mehrieh has become more popular among educated women.48 This is 
unsurprising considering the repeal of the 1967 Family Protection Law which 
provided women considerable legal rights as well as the institution of a new body 
of law that drastically lowered women’s legal and social standing.49 Thus, the 
practice of mehrieh has become crucial for women to avoid the potential ill-
effects of many of the discriminatory family laws. Education plays a key role in 
this practice. One woman reports how her brother used her doctoral degree as a 
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justification for the high mehrieh he requested for her marriage.50 In this system, a 
university education becomes a bargaining tool, a way for a woman to raise her 
social value and obtain for herself a series of protections and rights within the 
marriage agreement otherwise unavailable to her.  
A second useful factor of marriage for educated women is economic. 
Women consistently form extremely small proportions of the working population. 
Iran’s poor economy and patriarchal cultural tendencies continue to bar women 
from the labor market. Shavarini notes the frustration of many of Iranian women 
seeking to find employment. For women who do manage to find work, promotion 
is often difficult because of social ideas of gender and authority.51 Although 
Rezai-Rashti and Moghadam point out that women seem to chiefly view mehrieh 
not as a means of gaining economic power but as a means of securing or 
preventing divorce and other matters related to family law,52 education may also 
serve to secure the economic future of women by allowing them to marry into a 
higher socio-economic class than the one from which they come. With few 
prospects for financial independence, many women see education as a means of 
finding a suitable partner who will be able to provide for a family, thus securing 
their financial futures.53 In essence, in a society where women are given fewer 
rights and privileges and generally valued less than men, education becomes and 
invaluable tool for women to promote their own self-interests and increase their 
social standing, even if the ultimate end for many of these women is, in fact, 
marriage and domestic life.  
 
Islamic Feminism  
 
 Finally, this last section will examine the rise of Islamic feminism in Iran 
and its complex interplay with the university system. This section will draw on 
the trends and data reported in the previous sections as well as the cultural and 
historical information described above. Without an understanding of the issues 
and intricacies described in previous sections, it would be impossible to 
demonstrate how the rise in the number of educated young women, facilitated by 
the Islamic Revolution, aided the development of Islamic feminism in Iran. 
Further, Islamic feminists have been active in agitating for an increase in 
women’s rights and roles in the public sector. Thus, Islamic feminism and female 
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higher education in Iran have formed a cyclical relationship where one influences 
and facilitates the other. 
 Mehran argues a similar cyclical phenomenon relating to the participation 
of women in Iranian society and their welfare according to the Women’s 
Empowerment Framework (WEF) developed by Sara Longwe. Longwe’s model 
describes a hierarchal system where increased welfare is the first level of equality 
followed by access, conscientisation, participation, and finally control. While this 
framework argues an upward, linear movement, Mehran argues that in the case of 
Iran, a cyclical relationship between the levels of conscientisation and 
participation is more useful in understanding women’s roles in Iran following the 
Iranian revolution. Here, the term conscientisation is understood as the awareness 
that gender roles are cultural constructs that may be changed. Mehran contends 
that women actively participated in the Islamic Revolution. As a result, there was 
an increase in conscientisation. This increase in gender awareness in turn led to an 
increase in women’s participation in the decision-making process, and so on.54 In 
other words, an increase in participation leads to an increase in gender awareness. 
This author would slightly adapt this interpretation to explain the development of 
Islamic feminism and its role in higher education. After the revolution, women 
were able to participate in higher education at higher rates. This ability to be 
present in the public space coupled with the confidence and knowledge gained 
through education and achievement facilitated an increase in feminist thought, 
and the growing number of educated women supplied Iranian feminism with a 
broader audience. In the wake of the revolution, the promotion of religion within 
society and the concerted effort to create a uniquely Iranian society, this style of 
feminism developed distinct from Western feminist thought and consistent with 
Islamic and Iranian cultural values and experiences. The growing strength of 
Islamic feminism allowed it to assert itself more forcefully in society and 
advocate more effectively for an increase in women’s legal and social rights. 
When this was successful, it allowed women more roles in society and more 
ability to attend university. This subsequently led to an increase in women 
participating in Islamic feminist thought, and the cycle repeated itself.  
The emergence of Islamic feminism during the early revolutionary years is 
noted by Rezai-Rashti. These women challenged the discriminatory laws 
instituted by the new government and reinterpreted some of the religious texts in 
favor of more egalitarian applications. Rezai-Rashti notes the importance of 
Islamic feminists in promoting gender equality and challenging the government’s 
discriminatory gender policies since the beginning of the revolution.55 There were 
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certainly secular and westernized women, particularly among university faculty, 
who opposed gender discrimination based on humanistic values. Nafisi poignantly 
describes her own frustrations with the restrictive society based on her 
experiences in pre-revolution Iran and America where she was educated.56 
However, it is important to note that Islamic feminism is a branch of feminist 
thought that is unique in that it is grounded in Islamic tradition and thought rather 
than Western feminist thought applied to an Islamic society. While Islamic 
feminists may come from varying religious backgrounds and beliefs as well as 
different levels of religiosity, the school of thought cannot be separated from 
Islamic tradition. Therefore, more relevant to our discussion are the female 
seminaries (called howzevi),57 and the rise of women educated in and able to 
interpret the Koran.  
 Firstly, it is essential to note that not all female scholars of Islam are 
necessarily Islamic feminists. There are women that spend years studying the 
Koran but still apply the same patriarchal codes of wider society to their 
understandings. However, the fact that these seminaries exist and that women are 
allowed to experience these high levels of religious knowledge is essential to the 
development of Islamic feminism. A significant part of Islamic feminist 
scholarship focuses on reinterpreting Koranic texts in favor of more egalitarian 
gender policies. Many women go to seminaries in order to study the Islamic texts 
and body of law, some of whom apply Islamic feminist interpretations.58 
However, even the howzevi women who do not align themselves with Islamic 
feminist thought help to provide legitimacy to the position of Islamic feminist. By 
participating in religious scholarship, these women help to pave the way for other 
women to read and form their own interpretations of the Koran.  
The religious focus of the movement appeals to religious women and men, 
providing a righteous alternative to the patriarchal practices prominent in society. 
Here, it is interesting to note Tawasil’s research on women who study at 
seminaries, many under conservative religious leaders such as Ayatollah 
Khamanei and Ayatollah Larijani. Oftentimes, these women interpret their main 
roles in the traditional revolutionary sense as being mothers and Islamic militants. 
As a result, their primary duty remains marriage and raising Islamic children to be 
citizens of the Islamic Republic. Nonetheless, Tawasil contends that many of 
these women manage their domestic duty in a manner that allows their own 
upward social mobility within the male-dominated power structures.59 Although 
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studying at a seminary does not automatically make a woman an Islamic feminist, 
the very fact that women are allowed to be jurists and study at seminaries 
legitimizes the rights of female religious scholars to interpret the Koran in 
accordance with Islamic feminist thought. Further, by participating in high levels 
of society, these women forge the path for other women to do the same.  
 Islamic feminism is an important development because it allows an outlet 
for religious women to advocate for their rights within their own religious 
communities. Prior to the revolution, secular women’s organizations existed in 
order to promote women, but their secular orientation alienated many religious 
women. For example, the Woman’s Organization of Iran (WOI) campaigned for 
women’s rights in the pre-revolutionary era, even taking on religious issues such 
as honor killings. However, the lack of a religious orientation made the WOI 
unpopular among religious groups. Consequently, for many conservative religious 
people, feminism became associated with the secularism and modernism against 
which they struggled. Indeed, many of these policies that promoted women were 
mainly oriented toward urban, secular women, ultimately leaving behind the rural 
and religious women.60 
 In 1991, Zanan, Iran’s most prominent women’s publication, began 
publishing. It served as a mouthpiece for the growing coalition of women 
representing varying sects of society who sought to improve conditions for 
women in Iran. Indeed, Zanan was explicitly feminist and provided space for 
discussing many of the most crucial issues facing Iranian women as well as 
celebrating the achievements and joys of life as a woman.61 The 2008 closing of 
the magazine demonstrates its efficacy and the perceived threat it held in the eyes 
of the politically and religiously conservative sectors of society. Nonetheless, the 
magazine reopened in 2014,62 suggesting that there may once again be an increase 
in willingness to engage in feminist conversations, as found in the magazine 
which represents a platform for Islamic feminist thinkers to engage in ideological 
debate and discussion.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 The role of women in Iranian society remains a divisive subject. This 
paper has examined the complexity of the issue through the lens of women’s 
participation in higher education. The presence of women at universities in Iran is 
a promising proponent for the continued advancement of women in Iranian 
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society. The continuation of patriarchal norms, both those preserved in the society 
through religious practice and those resulting from the patriarchal culture 
predating the implementation of institutionalized Islam, are an ongoing challenge 
for women. While the paradoxical relationship of women’s rights and the Islamic 
Revolution is an interesting study, it is important to remember the persistent 
challenges facing women. Education in Iran has served as a platform for women 
to advance themselves personally, but also broadens their scope of influence on 
society and allows for the development and advancement of Islamic feminist 
thought. This development of Islamic feminism has allowed for Iranian women to 
find ways to better their conditions within their society in ways that Western 
feminist practice during the Pahlavi era did not. The Islamic Revolutions played a 
significant role in facilitating women’s ability to study at institutions of higher 
education, thus enabling an educated group of women to emerge in Islamic 
feminist thought, challenging the same discriminatory practices of the government 
that enabled their educational advancement. Overall, the continued education of 
women in Iran and the continued commitment of Islamic feminists to agitate for 
women’s rights appears to be the most effective and practical solution for 
advancement of women in Iranian society while also allowing the emerging 
changes to reflect a cultural tradition unique to Iranian society.
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